Moral sensibility,visceral representations,and social cohesion: A behavioral neuroscience perspective

Mind and Matter 3 (1):31-56 (2005)
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Abstract

The moral sentiments adumbrated by Adam Smith and Charles Darwin reflect some of our basic social appraisals of each other. One set of moral appraisals reflects disgust and withdrawal, a form of contempt. Another set of moral appraisals reflects active concern responses, an appreciation of the experiences (sympathy for some- one)of other individuals and approach related behaviors. While no one set of neural structures is designed for only moral appraisals, a diverse set of neural regions that include the gustatory/visceral neural axis, basal ganglia and iverse neocortical sites underlie moral judgment.

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