Normische gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische bedeutung Des nichtmonotonen schliessens
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (1):65-107 (2001)
Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality.
|Keywords||normic laws nonmonotonic reasoning ceteris paribus normality (prototypical vs. statistical) system theory evolution theory theory protection approximation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Hannes Leitgeb (2011). Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things. Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
Similar books and articles
Robert Klee (1992). Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus, and Psychological Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.
Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and A Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380-1389.
Marc Lange (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press.
Marcello Guarini (2000). Horgan and Tienson on Ceteris Paribus Laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.
Andreas Hüttemann, Alexander Reutlinger & Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus Laws. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Gerhard Schurz (2002). Ceteris Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 57 (3):351Ð372.
Gerhard Schurz (2005). Non-Monotonic Reasoning From an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective: Ontic, Logical and Cognitive Foundations. Synthese 146 (1-2):37 - 51.
Gerhard Schurz (2001). What is 'Normal'? An Evolution-Theoretic Foundation for Normic Laws and Their Relation to Statistical Normality. Philosophy of Science 68 (4):476-497.
Gerhard Schurz (2004). Normic Laws, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Unity of Science. In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 181-211.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #154,897 of 1,410,540 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #108,810 of 1,410,540 )
How can I increase my downloads?