David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder introduces and assesses three principal kinds of noncognitivist theory: the speech-act theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, the expressivist theories of Blackburn and Gibbard, and hybrid theories. He pays particular attention both to the philosophical problems about what moral facts could be about or how they could matter which noncognitivism seeks to solve, and to the deep problems that it faces, including the task of explaining both the nature of moral thought and the complexity of moral attitudes, and the Frege-Geach problem.
|Keywords||Ethics Cognitive science Emotivism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Call number||BJ45.5.S37 2010|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
Ryan J. Hay (2013). Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy Between Pejoratives and Moral Language. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):450-474.
Mark Schroeder (2013). Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce? Noûs 47 (3):409-430.
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