David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740 (2012)
Intuitively, the knowledge of one’s own intentional actions is different from the knowledge of actions of other sorts, including those of other people and unintentional actions of one's own. But how are we to understand this phenomenon? Does it pertain to all actions, under every description under which they are known? If so, then how is this possible? If not, then how should we think about cases that are exceptions to this principle? This paper is a critical survey of recent attempts to answer these questions. I consider views under three headings: "special source" views, which hold that the knowledge of one's intentional actions has a non-perceptual source; "special domain" views, which hold that some but not all aspects of one's intentional actions are known in a special way; and "special character" views, which hold that the knowledge of intentional actions is special not because of where it comes from, but because of some other respect in which it is different in kind from the knowledge of other things.
|Keywords||action non-observational knowledge self-knowledge intention|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1962). On Sensations of Position. Analysis 22 (3):55 - 58.
Arthur Danto (1963). What We Can Do. Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):435-445.
Keith S. Donnellan (1963). Knowing What I Am Doing. Journal of Philosophy 60 (14):401-409.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Schwenkler (2011). Perception and Practical Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
Richard Moran (2004). Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'. In J. Hyman & H. Steward (eds.), Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Suppl. 55). Cambridge University Press. 43-68.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought 1 (1):49-55.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Anne Newstead (2009). Interpreting Anscombe's Intention §32FF. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:157-176.
Niels van Miltenburg (2012). Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye&Quot;. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
Hanna Pickard (2004). Knowledge of Action Without Observation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):203–228.
Ladislav Tondl (2007). Rational Actions and the Integration of Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):91 - 110.
Added to index2012-03-26
Total downloads207 ( #2,661 of 1,102,993 )
Recent downloads (6 months)36 ( #2,620 of 1,102,993 )
How can I increase my downloads?