Non-Observational Knowledge of Action

Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740 (2012)
Intuitively, the knowledge of one’s own intentional actions is different from the knowledge of actions of other sorts, including those of other people and unintentional actions of one's own. But how are we to understand this phenomenon? Does it pertain to all actions, under every description under which they are known? If so, then how is this possible? If not, then how should we think about cases that are exceptions to this principle? This paper is a critical survey of recent attempts to answer these questions. I consider views under three headings: "special source" views, which hold that the knowledge of one's intentional actions has a non-perceptual source; "special domain" views, which hold that some but not all aspects of one's intentional actions are known in a special way; and "special character" views, which hold that the knowledge of intentional actions is special not because of where it comes from, but because of some other respect in which it is different in kind from the knowledge of other things.
Keywords action  non-observational knowledge  self-knowledge  intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00513.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive John Schwenkler, Non-Observational Knowledge of Action
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John Schwenkler (2011). Perception and Practical Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
Richard Moran (2004). Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'. In J. Hyman & H. Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 43-68.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
Anne Newstead (2009). Interpreting Anscombe's Intention §32FF. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:157-176.
Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye". Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
Hanna Pickard (2004). Knowledge of Action Without Observation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):203–228.
Ladislav Tondl (2007). Rational Actions and the Integration of Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):91 - 110.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

344 ( #2,515 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

59 ( #20,161 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.