Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio Juris 24 (2):140-155 (2011)
This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Alexy (1989). On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality. Ratio Juris 2 (2):167-183.
Robert Alexy (2002). The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press.
J. L. Austin (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press.
Stefano Bertea (2007). A Critique of Inclusive-Positivism. Archiv Fuer Rechts- Und Sozialphilosphie 93 (1):67-81.
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press 181-228.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
F. Atria (1999). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):537-577.
Neil MacCormick (2005). Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
Stefan Sciaraffa (2010). The Underlying Value of MacCormick's Post-Positivism. Jurisprudence 1 (1):121-136.
Neil MacCormick (1978). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
James Lee (2010). MacCormick's Jurisprudence Determined. Jurisprudence 1 (1):105-119.
Neil MacCormick (1982/1984). Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Michael Clark (1980). Review of Neil MacCormick, Legal Reason and Legal Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 21.
Torben Spaak (2007). Guidance and Constraint: The Action-Guiding Capacity of Neil MacCormick's Theory of Legal Reasoning. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 26 (4):343-376.
Neil MacCormick (2007). Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
Robert P. George (ed.) (1996). The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press.
Robert J. Henle (1989). An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism. By Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. Modern Schoolman 66 (2):166-167.
William C. Starr (1986). Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy. By Neil MacCormick. Modern Schoolman 63 (3):227-228.
Kurt Nutting (2002). Legal Practices and the Reason of the Law. Argumentation 16 (1):111-133.
Neil Maccormick (1982). Legal Reasoning and Practical Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1):271-286.
Added to index2011-05-12
Total downloads46 ( #67,939 of 1,707,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #104,934 of 1,707,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?