Non-monotonic reasoning from an evolution-theoretic perspective: Ontic, logical and cognitive foundations

Synthese 146 (1-2):37 - 51 (2005)
In the first part I argue that normic laws are the phenomenological laws of evolutionary systems. If this is true, then intuitive human reasoning should be fit in reasoning from normic laws. In the second part I show that system P is a tool for reasoning with normic laws which satisfies two important evolutionary standards: it is probabilistically reliable, and it has rules of low complexity. In the third part I finally report results of an experimental study which demonstrate that intuitive human reasoning is in well accord with basic argument patterns of system P.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118615
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Paul D. Thorn (2014). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.

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