Newton's substance monism, distant action, and the nature of Newton's empiricism: discussion of H. Kochiras “Gravity and Newton's substance counting problem”

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Keywords Matter  Action at a distance  Space  Substance  Newton  Empiricism
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References found in this work BETA
Steffen Ducheyne (2009). Understanding (in) Newton's Argument for Universal Gravitation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):227 - 258.
Andrew Janiak (2007). Newton and the Reality of Force. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (1):127-147.

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Similar books and articles
Hylarie Kochiras (2009). Gravity and Newton's Substance Counting Problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (3):267-280.
Hylarie Kochiras (2013). Causal Language and the Structure of Force in Newton'sSystem of the World. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (2):210-235.
Andrew Janiak (2007). Newton and the Reality of Force. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (1):127-147.
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