Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):348–356 (2006)
|Abstract||Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might have led to this misunderstanding.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Amartya Sen (1983). Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):113-132.
Donald H. Regan (1983). Against Evaluator Relativity: A Response to Sen. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):93-112.
Frederick S. Carney (1978). On McCormick and Teleological Morality. Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1):81 - 107.
Carson Strong (2008). Justifying Group-Specific Common Morality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (1):1-15.
Charles Sayward (1988). System Relativism. Ratio 1 (2):163-175.
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Douglas W. Portmore (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.
Mark Schroeder (2007). Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'. Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
Douglas W. Portmore (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):95–113.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #74,564 of 548,974 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,974 )
How can I increase my downloads?