1. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):230–244.
    Paul Pietroski, in Causing Actions (2000), aims to articulate a dualistic framework that 'makes room for persons'. What is especially intriguing about Pietroski's framework is that it denies both of the above assumptions: (i) it is resolutely non-naturalistic, and (ii) it is a dualism of events, said to steer between substance and property dualisms. If Pietroski is right then both naturalism and the three-part taxonomy are worse than mistaken: they are in..
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library
    27 downloads  |  Added to index: 2009-01-28  |  Mark as duplicate  |  Remove from index  |  Revision history
    Bookmark and Share