Of ghostly and mechanical events
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):230–244 (2004)
| Abstract | Paul Pietroski, in Causing Actions (2000), aims to articulate a dualistic framework that 'makes room for persons'. What is especially intriguing about Pietroski's framework is that it denies both of the above assumptions: (i) it is resolutely non-naturalistic, and (ii) it is a dualism of events, said to steer between substance and property dualisms. If Pietroski is right then both naturalism and the three-part taxonomy are worse than mistaken: they are in.. | |||||||||
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Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Review: Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):230 - 244.
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