David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591 (2007)
What makes an object the same persisting individual over time? Philosophers and psychologists have both grappled with this question, but from different perspectives—philosophers conceptually analyzing the criteria for object persistence, and psychologists exploring the mental mechanisms that lead us to experience the world in terms of persisting objects. It is striking that the same themes populate explorations of persistence in these two very different fields—e.g. the roles of spatiotemporal continuity, persistence through property change, and cohesion violations. Such similarities may reflect an underlying connection, in that psychological mechanisms of object persistence (especially relevant parts of mid-level visual object processing) may serve to underlie the intuitions about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. This would be a way for cognitive science to join these two disparate fields, helping to explain the possible origins and reliability of some metaphysical intuitions, and perhaps leading to philosophical progress.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Citations of this work BETA
John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Joshua Shepherd & James Justus (2015). X-Phi and Carnapian Explication. Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.
Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2015). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
Robert Carry Osborne (2016). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.
Similar books and articles
Dilip Ninan (2009). Persistence and the First-Person Perspective. Philosophical Review 118 (4):425--464.
M. Rush (2011). Picturing Persistence. Analysis 71 (4):637-641.
Nicholas Asher (1994). Problems with Persistence. Topoi 13 (1):37-49.
Michael Bruno & Shaun Nichols (2010). Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study. Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
Bradley Strawser (2011). Rea's Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism. Philosophia 39 (2):375-391.
Kristie Lyn Miller (2006). Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time. Springer.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2011). Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention? Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #62,996 of 1,789,728 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #166,078 of 1,789,728 )
How can I increase my downloads?