Overlappings: Probability-raising without causation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):40 – 46 (2000)
Abstract
The leading regularity, counterfactual, and agential accounts of causation converge on the idea that causation is probability-raising. While the necessity of probability-raising for causation remains in dispute, the sufficiency of probability-raising for causation is generally assumed, at least in the direct (no intermediaries involved) and precisely described case. I offer a class of counterexamples: overlappings.
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