On the content of experience

Abstract
The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00094.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.

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Citations of this work BETA
Briggs Wright (2012). Darkness Visible? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):39 - 55.

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Mark Leon (1987). Character, Content, and the Ontology of Experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):377-399.
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Ben Caplan (2007). On the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590-611.

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