Plurals

In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 716--767 (2006)
Abstract
Extension of the logical language to deliver plural reference and the logical relations that constitute knowledge of the singular and plural acquires empirical bite just in case it conforms with increasing precision to the syntax of the natural language and affords explanation of what speakers know about the distribution and meaning of plural expressions in their language. As for the syntax of natural language, this discussion, being none too precise, is guided throughout by just two considerations and their immediate consequences, which is discussed at greater length in this article. The first, morpheme univocality, is that a morpheme despite its various syntactic and morphological contexts has a single meaning that supports all its occurrences.
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0029
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