Principled chances

There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: (1) the Principal Principle, (2) the Basic Chance Principle, and (3) the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I offer an account of chance which meets all three: L*-chance. So the good news is that L*-chance meets (1)–(3). The bad news is that L*-chance turns out unlawful and unstable.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/54.1.27
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Rachael Briggs (2010). The Metaphysics of Chance. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):938-952.
J. T. Roberts (2013). Chance Without Credence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.
Marc Lange (2009). Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):312-345.
N. Tosh (forthcoming). Finite Frequentism in a Big World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu027.

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