Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility

Abstract
This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness
Keywords Consciousness  Cognitive access  Attention  Working memory  Global workspace  Neural correlate of consciousness
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References found in this work BETA
Tim Bayne (2010). The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford ;Oxford University Press.
Ned Block (2002). A. G enera. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 206.

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