David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750 (2011)
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational
|Keywords||Perceptual Content Representationalism Relationalism Disjunctivism Perceptual Relations|
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Citations of this work BETA
Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Perceptual Content and Relations. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.
Alex Byrne (2013). Perception and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-13.
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