Perceptual Content Defended

Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750 (2011)
Abstract
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.
Keywords Perceptual Content  Representationalism  Relationalism  Disjunctivism  Perceptual Relations
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/41330879
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Susanna Schellenberg, Perceptual Content Defended
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Indrek Reiland (2015). Experience, Seemings, and Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-09-21

Total downloads

1,409 ( #115 of 1,781,385 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

360 ( #320 of 1,781,385 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.