Pleonastic Fregeanism

Fregeans hold that propositional attitudes are relations to structured propositions whose basic constituents are concepts, or modes of presentation, of the objects and properties our beliefs are about. It is widely thought that there are compelling objections to the Fregean theory of mental and linguistic content. However, as I try to show, these objections are met by the version of Frege’s theory which I call Pleonastic Fregeanism
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DOI 10.5840/wcp202000633
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