Paley's Inductive Inference to Design

Philosophia Christi 7 (2):491-502 (2005)
In a recent article, Graham Oppy offers a lucid and intriguing examination of William Paley's design argument. Oppy sets two goals for his article. First, he sets out to challenge the "almost universal assumption" that Paley's argument is inductive by revealing it actually to be a deductive argument. Second, he attempts to expose Paley's argument as manifestly poor when interpreted in this way. I will argue that Oppy is unsuccessful in accomplishing his first goal, leaving his second goal quite irrelevant. Contrary to Oppy's interpretation, Paley's argument is best interpreted as an inference to the best explanation.
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