David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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How can perception yield knowledge of the world? One challenge in answering this question is that one necessarily perceives from a particular location. Thus, what is immediately perceptually available is subject to situational features, such as lighting conditions and one’s location. Nonetheless, one can perceive the shape and color of objects. My dissertation aims to provide an explanation for how this is possible. The main thesis is that giving such an explanation requires abandoning the traditional model of perception as a two-place relation between subjects and objects in favor of a model of perception as a three-place relation between subjects, objects, and situations.
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Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
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