Perceptual knowledge derailed

Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45 (2003)
The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities.
Keywords Competence  Counterfactual  Epistemology  Knowledge  Perceptual
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    Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
    Joshua Allen Smith (2008). Relevant Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.
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