Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- Annamaria Schiaparelli (2009). Plotinus on Dialectic. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (3):253-287.In this paper, Plotinus' treatise On Dialectic I.3 [20] is discussed. In the first part of the paper, I argue that for Plotinus the importance of dialectic stands in the method of division that enables one to grasp the ‘what it is’. I present and examine some passages which contain a description of dialectic and an account of its activity. I then look into the reasons why Plotinus affirms the superiority of dialectic, as he conceived it, over logic, as the Peripatetics and the Stoics conceived it. The second part of the paper explores the relation between dialectic and truth and that between dialectic and soul: in this discussion Plotinus offers some interesting and more original epistemological remarks.
Similar books and articles
An important and long over-due study of the significance of Hegel's dialectic.
After speculation that the dialectic is as yet unrealized, a kind of "unfinished project," three areas in which the dialectic remains alive are outlined: 1) in reflexivity, in which the theory of ideology demands to be confronted with the contemporary theory and experience of "multiple subject positions"; 2) in historiography, in which the dialectic is not a philosophical position but a critical operation performed on traditional historical narrative; and, finally, 3) in contradiction, a structure the dialectic does not posit, but causes to emerge and to become visible in familiar and seemingly unproblematical situations (Brecht's "estrangement effect").
Following strict rules of interpretation, this book focuses on the ideas in Plato's early and middle dialogues that lie within the fields now called logic and methodology, specifically elenchus and dialectic and the method of hypothesis.
Plato wrote dialogues, and he praised dialectic, or conversation, as a suitable style for fruitful philosophical investigation. His works are great literature; and nodoubt this quality derives much from their form as dialogues. They also have definite philosophical content; and an important part of this content is their dialecticalepistemology. Dialectic is part of the content of Plato's philosophy. Can we reconcile this content with his literary style? I shall examine and sharpen the sense of this problem by referring to four passages from different works of Plato: Parmenides 132b-c, Protagoras 351-2, Sophist 248-9, Republic 592. In these passages we can distinguish a main position, which represents what it is natural to label Platonism, from a line of thought which diverges from that position and yet also seems authentically Platonic. I argue that the solution to this tension lies in the notion of dialectic as a tentative and exploratory method of philosophy. This view of dialectic is in some conflict with Plato's official account of the method as guaranteed to deliver fundamental truth; but that conflict presents one more version of the phenomenon which I am exploring. The theory of dialectic provides philosophical support for the method of dialogue. That is how philosophy and literature are linked in Plato's pursuit of truth.
Introduction.--The literary form and philosophical content of the Platonic dialogue.--Plato's method of dialectic.
This paper challenges the traditional view that Plotinus identifies matter and evil. A rational reconstruction of Plotinus’s tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task of interpreting Plotinus’ texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter’s totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus speaks of matter per se which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short, matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy—not in itself (for it isn’t), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it.
Introduction Since my work in medieval logic has concentrated on dialectic. I
have tried to trace scholastic treatments of dialectic to discussions of it in
...
In the beginning : dialogue and dialectic in Plato -- Dialectic : via antiqua -- Dialectic : via moderna -- Dialogue : a systematic outlook -- Dialogue : interruption -- Against writing -- (Dialectical) conclusion.
Dialectic is more than an epistemological principle. More fundamentally, it is a form of praxis — consciousness, selftransformative activity — from which the logical principles of dialectic are then abstracted. Arising in dialog, dialectical praxis is directed toward emancipatory goals through its fidelity to negation. This essay concludes with speculation as to the conditions of nature and human beings that are compatible with the emergence of dialectic.
This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads . Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus’ view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus’ account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition.
Discussion of Annamaria Schiaparelli, Plotinus on dialectic
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

