Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy [Book Review]

Hume Studies 36 (1):67-76 (2011)
Abstract
My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world" (Kail, 67). The two parts are (loosely) tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.One caveat: ..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,999
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
P. J. E. Kail (2001). Projection and Necessity in Hume. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):24–54.
P. J. E. Kail (2005). Hume's Ethical Conclusion. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-06-06

Total downloads

136 ( #6,123 of 1,101,076 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

97 ( #432 of 1,101,076 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.