Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

Hume Studies 36 (1) (2011)
Abstract My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world" (Kail, 67). The two parts are (loosely) tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.One caveat: ..
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    P. J. E. Kail (2001). Projection and Necessity in Hume. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):24–54.
    P. J. E. Kail (2005). Hume's Ethical Conclusion. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press.

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