David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2003)
People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.
|Keywords||Intentionality (Philosophy Practical reason|
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|Buy the book||$0.97 used (98% off) $6.30 new (81% off) $32.50 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.I56.S39 2003|
|ISBN(s)||0807855626 0199250375 9780199250370|
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Citations of this work BETA
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Maria Alvarez (2009). How Many Kinds of Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
Maria Alvarez (2008). Reasons and the Ambiguity of 'Belief'. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.
Hilla Jacobson (2014). Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument From the Particularity of Love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):n/a-n/a.
Till Grüne-yanoff (2008). Action Explanations Are Not Inherently Normative. Theoria 74 (1):60-78.
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