Reasons as right-makers
Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):279-296 (2009)
| Abstract | This paper sketches a right-maker account of normative practical reasons along functionalist lines. The approach is contrasted with other similar accounts, in particular John Broome's analysis of reasons as explanations of oughts | |||||||||
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