David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414 (2007)
It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.
Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
Robert Schroer (2014). The Goldilocks Problem of the Specificity of Visual Phenomenal Content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.
Robert Schroer (2009). Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism? Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110.
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