David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452 (2013)
Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully confident in one's beliefs and patterns of reasoning. In rough outline, the argument is as follows: Consider a thinker who deduces a conclusion from a justified initial premise via an incredibly long sequence of small competent deductions. Surely, such a thinker should suspect that he has made a mistake somewhere. And surely, given this, he should not believe the conclusion of the deduction even though he has a justified belief in the initial premise.
|Keywords||Single-premise closure Justification Competent deduction Deductive inference Long sequence argument Rational self-doubt|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Justified Inference. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
David James Barnett (2014). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Similar books and articles
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Single Premise Deduction and Risk. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
Nicholas Silins (2005). Transmission Failure Failure. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71 - 102.
Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
M. Yan (2013). When Does Epistemic Closure Fail? Analysis 73 (2):260-264.
Federico Luzzi (2012). Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
James L. White (1991). Knowledge and Deductive Closure. Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Sven Bernecker (2012). Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Ralph Wedgwood (2008). Contextualism About Justified Belief. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (9):1-20.
Yuval Avnur (2012). Closure Reconsidered. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).
Dennis R. Cooley (2012). Epistemic Closure's Clash with Technology in New Markets. Journal of Business Ethics 108 (2):181-199.
Federico Luzzi (2010). Counter-Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
Reed Richter (1990). Ideal Rationality and Hand Waving. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.
Martin Smith (2013). Two Notions of Epistemic Risk. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1069-1079.
N. M. L. Nathan (2001). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.
Guido Melchior (2010). Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (30):259-285.
Added to index2010-10-23
Total downloads234 ( #10,213 of 1,792,259 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #36,117 of 1,792,259 )
How can I increase my downloads?