Replacing truth

Inquiry 50 (6):606 – 621 (2007)
Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our conceptual competence leads us into inconsistency. I call this alternative the inconsistency approach to the liar. Although this approach has many positive features, I argue that several of the well-developed versions of it that have appeared recently are unacceptable. In particular, they do not recognize that if truth is an inconsistent concept, then we should replace it with new concepts that do the work of truth without giving rise to paradoxes. I outline an inconsistency approach to the liar paradox that satisfies this condition.
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ISBN(s) 9780199653850
DOI 10.1080/00201740701698589
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Pinder (2015). A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):151-161.
Colin Johnston (2014). Conflicting Rules and Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):410-433.

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