David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 50 (6):606 – 621 (2007)
Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our conceptual competence leads us into inconsistency. I call this alternative the inconsistency approach to the liar. Although this approach has many positive features, I argue that several of the well-developed versions of it that have appeared recently are unacceptable. In particular, they do not recognize that if truth is an inconsistent concept, then we should replace it with new concepts that do the work of truth without giving rise to paradoxes. I outline an inconsistency approach to the liar paradox that satisfies this condition.
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References found in this work BETA
Jody Azzouni (2007). The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It. Inquiry 50 (6):590 – 605.
Jody Azzouni (2003). The Strengthened Liar, the Expressive Strength of Natural Languages, and Regimentation. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):329–350.
Charles Chihara (1979). The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation. Philosophical Review 88 (4):590-618.
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
Citations of this work BETA
Stewart Shapiro (2010). So Truth is Safe From Paradox: Now What? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 147 (3):445 - 455.
Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
Arvid Båve (2012). On Using Inconsistent Expressions. Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Matti Eklund (2007). Meaning-Constitutivity. Inquiry 50 (6):559-574.
Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.
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