Replacing truth

Inquiry 50 (6):606-621 (2007)
Abstract
Kevin Scharp proposes an original account of the nature and logic of truth, on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth; and offers a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.
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ISBN(s) 9780199653850
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References found in this work BETA
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.

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