Replacing Truth
| Abstract | The primary goals of this book, Replacing Truth, are to present and justify the view that truth is an inconsistent concept and to offer a pair of concepts that are to serve, for certain purposes, as replacements for truth. The positive proposal I offer is multi-faceted and does not fit neatly into established ways of classifying contemporary work on truth. For this reason, a substantial amount of stage setting is required. The book has three parts. Parts I and II present both the background information and the conditions on acceptable theories that are needed to understand and appreciate the positive account of truth given in Part III. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesKevin Scharp (forthcoming). Truth, the Liar, and Relativism. Philosophical Review.
Kevin Scharp (2007). Replacing Truth. Inquiry 50 (6):606 – 621.
Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3).
Scott Soames (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
Barry Allen (2012). Aristotle on the Nature of Truth. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):135-136.
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
Donald Davidson (2005). Truth and Predication. Harvard University Press.
ME Kalderon (1997). The Transparency of Truth. Mind 106 (423):475-497.
James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
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