Mind 114 (456):1135-1183 (2005)
|Abstract||The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Keith S. Donnellan (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Peter Millican (1990). Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:167 - 220.
Paul Elbourne (2010). The Existence Entailments of Definite Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (1):1-10.
Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2005). The Loss of Uniqueness. Mind 114 (456):1185 - 1222.
Gregory Landini (1991). A New Interpretation of Russell's Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (1):37-69.
Saul A. Kripke (1977). Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press.
John-Michael Kuczynski (2005). Why Definite Descriptions Really Are Referring Terms. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):45-79.
Paulo Roberto Margutti Pinto, Wittgenstein and Semantic Presuppositions Generated by Definite Descriptions in Subject-Position.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #15,525 of 549,074 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,228 of 549,074 )
How can I increase my downloads?