Representing Von neumann–morgenstern games in the situation calculus
|Abstract||Sequential von Neumann–Morgernstern (VM) games are a very general formalism for representing multi-agent interactions and planning problems in a variety of types of environments. We show that sequential VM games with countably many actions and continuous utility functions have a sound and complete axiomatization in the situation calculus. This axiomatization allows us to represent game-theoretic reasoning and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. We discuss the application of various concepts from VM game theory to the theory of planning and multi-agent interactions, such as representing concurrent actions and using the Baire topology to define continuous payoff functions.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Johan van Benthem (2003). Logic Games Are Complete for Game Logics. Studia Logica 75 (2).
Lauri Carlson (1994). Logic for Dialogue Games. Synthese 99 (3):377 - 415.
Akira Okada & Eyal Winter (2002). A Non-Cooperative Axiomatization of the Core. Theory and Decision 53 (1):1-28.
Antonio Quesada (2001). The Normal Form is Not Sufficient. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):235-243.
William Harper (1988). Decisions, Games and Equilibrium Solutions. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:344 - 362.
David Hawkins (1945). Book Review:Theory of Games and Economic Behavior John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 12 (3):221-.
Prakash P. Shenoy (1998). Game Trees For Decision Analysis. Theory and Decision 44 (2):149-171.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?