David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Tobias Schlicht, Anne Springer, Kirsten G. Volz, Gottfried Vosgerau, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Daniela Simon & Alexandra Zinck
Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687 – 709 (2009)
In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does not only allow for a deeper understanding of different self-conceptions, but also for a formulation of new hypotheses regarding the cultural influence on self-representations. As one example, we will highlight the role of the proposed levels of self-representation for emotional experience and formulate some major implications of our interdisciplinary framework for future empirical research
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rex Welshon (2013). Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):839 - 862.
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