David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2007)
Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record straight, by advancing a version of the Humean theory of reasons which withstands this sophisticated array of objections. Schroeder defends a radical new view which, if correct, means that the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely misunderstood. Along the way, he raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.
|Keywords||Ethics Act (Philosophy Agent (Philosophy Emotions (Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$19.47 used (79% off) $70.18 new (23% off) $90.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1031.S35 2007|
|ISBN(s)||9780199299508 0199299501 9780199575725|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Neil Sinclair (forthcoming). Reasons, Inescapability and Persuasion. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Daniel Whiting (2016). Against Second‐Order Reasons. Noûs 49 (4).
Kurt Sylvan (2015). What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Ralph Wedgwood (2015). The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.
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