Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 72 (4):735-739 (2012)
|Abstract||Next SectionIn a recent article in this journal, John Skorupski alleges that the expressivist view developed in Being For fails on its own terms. However, in order to set up his criticism of my book, he helps himself to the very assumption that it is the main contribution of my book to show how to reject. It is hardly a problem for me that you can re-create the problem I showed how to solve by making the very assumption that I showed led to the problem. This article illustrates what might have led to Skorupski's confusion|
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