David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285 (2012)
Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality—the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role—even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence.
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Belief Pragmatic encroachment Rationality Reasons John Hawthorne Jason Stanley Jeremy Fantl Matthew McGrath|
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Citations of this work BETA
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Adam Zweber (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (2015). Evidence Against Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143.
Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). Dynamic Permissivism. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
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