David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 126 (1-2):261 - 281 (2001)
The article defends a modern version of the correspondence theory of truth, one which explains the truth of a statement in terms of referential relations between its parts and aspects of the world. Davidson's views on truth are discussed in detail and, in particular, a critical eye is cast over his degradation of the concept of reference which, if successful, would preclude the possibility of developing a full-blooded correspondence theory
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