David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 181 (3):413-431 (2011)
Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a specific theory of reduction (the ‘conceptual entailment approach’), yields a new analysis of truthmaking. This analysis is intuitively appealing and avoids the problem of necessary truths, which poses a serious obstacle for standard accounts.
|Keywords||Truthmakers Explanation Ontology Truth Reduction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Schulte (2014). Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.
Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Wojciech Wciórka & Piotr Wilkin (2013). Do We Need a New Theory of Truthmaking? Some Comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):591-604.
Similar books and articles
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Postscript to Why Truthmakers. In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Greg Restall (2000). Modelling Truthmaking. Logique Et Analyse 43:211-230.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Joan Pagès (2005). Truthmaking and Supervenience. Theoria 20 (2):191-197.
Greg Restall (1996). Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
David Liggins (2005). Truthmakers and Explanation. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 105--115.
Added to index2010-03-01
Total downloads114 ( #8,600 of 1,100,500 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #80,501 of 1,100,500 )
How can I increase my downloads?