David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethics 117 (2):265-000 (2007)
It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to the rescue on all sides. While consequentialism says that every agent ought always to do that action that will bring about the most good, according to Agent- Relative Teleology.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Schroeder (2012). Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.
Douglas W. Portmore (2007). Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Theresa Lopez, Jennifer Zamzow, Michael Gill & Shaun Nichols (2009). Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):305-319.
Alex Gregory (2014). A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
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Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2009):1-9.
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