Teleology, agent‐relative value, and 'good'

Ethics 117 (2):265-000 (2007)
Abstract
It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to the rescue on all sides. While consequentialism says that every agent ought always to do that action that will bring about the most good, according to Agent- Relative Teleology.
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Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.

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