Two conceptions of sparse properties
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102 (2004)
| Abstract | Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature. | |||||||||
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