The Contrast-sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions

Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245 (2008)
Knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. One natural explanation for this is that the knowledge relation is contrastive ( s knows that p rather than q ). But can the binary view of knowledge ( s knows that p ) explain contrast-sensitivity? I review some of the linguistic data supporting contrast-sensitivity, and critique the three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. I conclude that the contrast-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions shows that knowledge is a contrastive relation
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Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2014). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.

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