11. “Two Definitions of ‘Cause,’ Newton, and the Significance of the Humean distinction between Natural and Philosophical Relations,”
Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 5 (1):83-101 (2007)
|Abstract||The main aim of this paper is to explore why it is so important for Hume to defi ne ‘cause’ as he does. This will shed light on the signifi cance of the natural/philosophical relation (hereafter NPR) distinction in the Treatise. Hume's use of the NPR distinction allows him to dismiss on general grounds conceptions of causation at odds with his own. In particular, it allows him to avoid having to engage in detailed re-interpretation of potentially confl icting theories formulated by natural philosophers. Moreover, it provides an instance of the normative nature of Hume's “science of man.” The paper argues that the NPR distinction - in conjunction with the so-called copy principle - is meant to undercut appeals to the authority of theories not founded on Hume's “principles.” In order to illustrate its claims about Hume, this essay explores some aspects of Newton's natural philosophy. Finally, this paper resolves a long-standing interpretive problem: how to reconcile Hume's two “defi nitions” of causation in the Treatise|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tamás Demeter (forthcoming). Post-Mechanical Explanation in the Natural and Moral Sciences: The Language of Nature and Human Nature in David Hume and William Cullen. Jahrbuch für Europäische Wissenschaftskultur.
Jaime de Salas (1991). Hume and Newton. Philosophy and Theology 6 (1):21-38.
David Landy (2006). Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction. Hume Studies 32 (1):119-139.
Paul Hoffman (2011). Hume on the Distinction of Reason. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1131 - 1141.
Jacqueline Taylor (2011). Gilding and Staining and the Significance of Our Moral Sentiments. Hume Studies 36 (1):89-95.
Graciela de Pierris (2006). Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology. Hume Studies 32 (2):277-329.
Eric Schliesser (2011). Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Hume Studies 36 (1):67-76.
Graciela De Pierris (2002). Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):499 - 545.
Added to index2010-06-17
Total downloads31 ( #44,874 of 739,325 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,325 )
How can I increase my downloads?