David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 63 (3):106 (1996)
Critics of Laudan's normative naturalism have questioned whether methodological rules can be regarded as empirical hypotheses about relations between means and ends. Drawing on Laudan's defense that rules of method are contingent on assumptions about the world, I argue that even if such rules can be shown to be analytic in principle (Kaiser 1991), in practice the warrant for such rules will be empirical. Laudan's naturalism, however, acquires normative force only by construing both methods and epistemic goals as instrumental to practical concerns, and issues only in context-specific and not general methodological principles
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Kristin Shrader-Frechette (2007). Relative Risk and Methodological Rules for Causal Inferences. Biological Theory 2 (4):332-336.
Arthur M. Diamond (2009). Fixing Ideas: How Research is Constrained by Mandated Formalism. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (2):191-206.
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