David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 22 (3):191-212 (2012)
The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the dialectic and, in principle, constitutes a fully adequate empirical standard for judging that an artifact is intelligent on a par with human beings. However, the paper carries the debate forward by arguing that the sociolinguistic factors highlighted in externalist views in the philosophy of language indicate the need for a fundamental shift in perspective in a Truly Total Turing Test (4T). It’s not enough to focus on Dennett’s individual robot viewed as a system; instead, we need to focus on an ongoing system of such artifacts. Hence a 4T should evaluate the general category of cognitive organization under investigation, rather than the performance of single specimens. From this comprehensive standpoint, the question is not whether an individual instance could simulate intelligent behavior within the context of a pre-existing sociolinguistic culture developed by the human cognitive type. Instead the key issue is whether the artificial cognitive type itself is capable of producing a comparable sociolinguistic medium
|Keywords||Artificial intelligence Chinese room argument Computational theory of mind Mental content Semantic externalism Turing tests|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Paul Schweizer (1998). The Truly Total Turing Test. Minds and Machines 8 (2):263-272.
Stevan Harnad (2000). Minds, Machines and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
Jamie Cullen (2009). Imitation Versus Communication: Testing for Human-Like Intelligence. Minds and Machines 19 (2):237-254.
Tyler Cowen & Michelle Dawson, What Does the Turing Test Really Mean? And How Many Human Beings (Including Turing) Could Pass?
Stevan Harnad (1989). Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (4):5-25.
Ayse Pinar Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
Justin Leiber (1995). On Turing's Turing Test and Why the Matter Matters. Synthese 104 (1):59-69.
Dale Jacquette (1993). Who's Afraid of the Turing Test? Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):63-74.
Stevan Harnad (1995). Does Mind Piggyback on Robotic and Symbolic Capacity? In H. Morowitz & J. Singer (eds.), The Mind, the Brain, and Complex Adaptive Systems. Addison Wesley.
S. Harnad (2000). Minds, Machines and Turing. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
Ayse P. Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
A. P. Saygin & I. Cicekli (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
Added to index2012-03-08
Total downloads17 ( #80,459 of 1,004,464 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,617 of 1,004,464 )
How can I increase my downloads?