The effect of base rate, careful analysis, and the distinction between decisions from experience and from description
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):281-281 (2007)
Barbey & Sloman (B&S) attribute base-rate neglect to associative processes (like retrieval from memory) that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. This commentary notes that associative responses can also lead to base-rate overweighting. We suggest that the difference between the two patterns is related to the distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description
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