Truthmakers for Truths about Truth
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Those who endorse correspondence theories of truth or truthmaker maximalism accept that corresponding to the world (or having a truthmaker) is a necessary condition for being true. This condition has been criticized recently, but the arguments of these objections are unsound. Instead, I argue that by reflecting on the truthmakers for sentences containing ‘true’, we see that ‘every truth has a truthmaker’ has several unacceptable consequences, the most serious of which is that it is self-refuting. It follows that correspondence theories of truth and truthmaker maximalism are unacceptable.
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