David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180 (2001)
The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, I will argue that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world
|Keywords||Belief Content Epistemology Experience Mcdowell, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas S. Kuhn (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
Michael Luntley (2003). Nonconceptual Content and the Sound of Music. Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.
Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
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