The hypothetical imperative?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372 (2005)
Abstract
According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some - those who have an end.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400500191958
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References found in this work BETA
Gary Watson (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Mark Schroeder (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Schroeder (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.
Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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