David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122 (2009)
In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an agent’s reasons for her action by looking at her actual or possible practical deliberation.
|Keywords||humean theory reasons smith|
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Paul Faulkner (2012). The Practical Rationality of Trust. Synthese (9):1-15.
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