Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618 (2007)
|Abstract||It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity|
|Keywords||Semantic externalism Self-knowledge Privileged access to content|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Chris Fraser (2011). Knowledge and Error in Early Chinese Thought. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10 (2):127-148.
Frederick A. Olafson (1953). A Note on Perceptual Illusion. Journal of Philosophy 50 (April):274-277.
Bernard Molyneux (2009). Why Experience Told Me Nothing About Transparency. Noûs 43 (1):116-136.
Andrea Christofidou (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity. Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.
Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
Kaoru Noguchi (2003). The Relationship Between Visual Illusion and Aesthetic Preference – an Attempt to Unify Experimental Phenomenology and Empirical Aesthetics. Axiomathes 13 (3-4):261-281.
Laura Schroeter (2008). Why Be an Anti-Individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.
Masaharu Mizumoto & Masato Ishikawa (2005). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Bodily Illusion Experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):3-19.
Laura Schroeter (2007). Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #53,879 of 549,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?