Illusion of transparency

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618 (2007)
Abstract
It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity
Keywords Semantic externalism  Self-knowledge  Privileged access to content
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
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