The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism

Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107 (2006)
Abstract Does what you know depend on what is at stake for you? That is, is the knowledge relation sensitive to the subject’s practical interests? Subject sensitive invariantists (Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Hawthorne, 2004, ch. 4; Stanley, forthcoming) say that the answer is yes. They claim to capture the contextualist data without the shifty semantics. I will argue that the answer is no. The knowledge relation is sensitive to what is in question for the attributor, rather than what is at stake for the subject. There is no substitute for the contextualist semantics.
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