The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism

Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107 (2006)
Abstract
Does what you know depend on what is at stake for you? That is, is the knowledge relation sensitive to the subject’s practical interests? Subject sensitive invariantists (Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Hawthorne, 2004, ch. 4; Stanley, forthcoming) say that the answer is yes. They claim to capture the contextualist data without the shifty semantics. I will argue that the answer is no. The knowledge relation is sensitive to what is in question for the attributor, rather than what is at stake for the subject. There is no substitute for the contextualist semantics.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-1731-9
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
Jessica Brown (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.

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