The Logic of Explanatory Power

Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127 (2011)
This article introduces and defends a probabilistic measure of the explanatory power that a particular explanans has over its explanandum. To this end, we propose several intuitive, formal conditions of adequacy for an account of explanatory power. Then, we show that these conditions are uniquely satisfied by one particular probabilistic function. We proceed to strengthen the case for this measure of explanatory power by proving several theorems, all of which show that this measure neatly corresponds to our explanatory intuitions. Finally, we briefly describe some promising future projects inspired by our account.
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DOI 10.1086/658111
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Clark Glymour (2015). Probability and the Explanatory Virtues. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.

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David E. Nelson (1996). Confirmation, Explanation, and Logical Strength. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):399-413.

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